|
Saudi
Arabs,
Americans
and
Oil
By
Robert
L.
Norberg
Human
Resources
In
1949,
when
Harry
Snyder
was
hired
to
head
up
the
training
of
Saudi
Arabs
for
Aramco,
James
Terry
Duce,
a
company
executive
in
New
York,
told
him
what
was
expected:
| Your
task
at
Aramco
is
to
train
Saudis
as
quickly
and
as
soundly
as
possible
to
operate
the
Saudi
oil
industry.
Inevitably,
the
Saudi
Arab
Government
will
eventually
nationalize
the
industry.
When
that
occurs,
we
want
the
young
Saudis
to
have
attained
the
proficiency
that
will
enable
them
to
operate
the
oil
industry
efficiently
and
with
goodwill
toward
Aramco.
Thus
they
will
be
serving
their
country's
best
interests
and
will
be
protecting
the
interests
of
our
parent
companies.1 |
This
vision
of
the
training
mission
and
its
ultimate
result
might
have
appeared
reasonably
attainable
if
recruits
were
available
from
local
schools,
knew
a
bit
of
English,
and
had
some
exposure
to
industrial
practices.
But
those
conditions
did
not
exist
when
the
concession
agreement
was
signed
in
1933,
nor
in
1949
as
the
postwar
development
of
Saudi
Arabia's
petroleum
resources
gathered
momentum.
Tom
Barger,
a
geologist
who
arrived
in
Arabia
in
1937
and
rose
to
board
chairman
before
retiring
in
1969,
recalled
many
years
later:
| [One]
aspect
that
impressed
me
was
the
enormous,
inordinate
poverty
of
the
inhabitants.
As
I
found
out
later,
nearly
everybody
was
hungry
most
of
the
time.
.
.
.
There's
no
education,
obviously.
The
few
people
who
could
read
and
write
largely
had
taught
themselves.
And
there
were
some
very
learned
men,
as
a
matter
of
fact,
among
this
population,
although
most
of
it
was
illiterate.
They
had
practically
no
mechanical
skills.
We
had
new
employees
who
couldn't
get
out
of
a
room
because
they
didn't
know
how
to
use
a
doorknob."2 |
B.
C.
Nelson,
who
served
Aramco
in
employee
relations
for
many
years,
recalled
in
1965
what
it
had
been
like
for
Saudis
recruited
to
Aramco
in
the
early
years
of
the
enterprise:
| Word
spread
to
the
desert
and
townspeople
that
in
exchange
for
some
physical
effort
the
blue-eyed
foreigners
would
give
a
man
a
handful
of
silver!
And
so
they
flocked
to
Aramco's
budding
oil
centers
.
.
.
Imagine
the
effect
on
a
recruit
to
be
plunged
into
the
mechanical
age
--
none
of
which
fit
in
with
his
prior
orientation
or
culture
--
with
little
or
nothing
in
his
experience
to
help
him
adjust.
The
most
amazing
thing
about
these
times
in
terms
of
one
small
facet
of
an
Industrial
Relations
problem
--
absenteeism-was
not
that,
when
they
were
handed
their
bag
of
money,
they
returned
to
their
tribe
with
their
glad
tidings,
but
rather
that
they
ever
came
back
to
work.
Industrial
discipline
was
practically
unknown,
so
the
amazing
thing
was
that
there
was
only
a
75
percent
turnover
in
the
first
few
years.3 |
On-the-job
training
began
on
an
informal
basis
in
the
1930s
and
was
soon
complemented
by
rudimentary
industrial
training
in
classrooms.
But
without
English,
Arabic
literacy,
and
basic
arithmetic,
there
was
a
limit
to
the
progress
Saudis
could
make
in
job
performance
and
advancement.
In
1944,
with
operations
revived
after
a
wartime
suspension,
the
Jabal
(meaning
"mountain"
or
"hill")
School
was
opened
in
Dhahran.
| Surely
in
1944
no
one
expected
history
to
remember
the
humble
Jabal
School.
Yet
the
little
company
school
endures
as
a
symbol
for
development
--
not
for
the
development
of
an
oil
company,
but
for
the
development
of
a
generation
of
very
special
young
men.
Many
Saudis
were
introduced
to
the
mystery
of
letters
and
numbers
at
the
Jabal
School.
Among
them
were
future
scholars,
successful
businessmen
and
powerful
executives.4 |
The
Jabal
School
was
the
beginning
of
an
ever-evolving,
structured
program
of
job-related
training
and
general
education
that
replicated
under
corporate
auspices
what
an
American
might
have
experienced
in
public
institutions,
with
grade
school-junior
high
(company
classrooms
in-Kingdom),
high
school
(assignments
abroad,
often
Lebanon),
and
college
(primarily
in
U.S.
institutions).
One
Jabal
School
pupil
learned
to
type
at
100
wpm
and
expressed
an
early
aspiration
to
become
Aramco's
"first
Saudi
secretary."
A
Bedouin
boy,
he
had
been
attracted
to
Aramco
in
the
first
place
because
of
the
opportunity
for
schooling,
joining
in
1947
at
the
age
of
12.
Not
long
after
he
returned
from
the
U.S.
in
1963
with
two
degrees,
including
a
Stanford
M.S.
in
geology,
his
name
appeared
in
a
lengthy
Wall
Street
Journal
article
about
Aramco.
At
the
time
only
one
Saudi
had
risen
as
high
as
department
manager.
Asked
this
time
about
his
aspirations,
the
30-year-old
Ali
Naimi
replied,
tongue-in-cheek,
"Becoming
the
first
Saudi
president
of
Aramco."
That
was
to
transpire
in
1984,
and
in
1995
he
was
named
Saudi
Arabia's
Minister
of
Petroleum
and
Mineral
Resources.
Naimi's
Jabal
School
classmates,
and
many
who
followed
later
on
increasingly
sophisticated
training
and
education
tracks
in
modern
facilities,
began
filling
jobs
at
all
levels
of
the
company,
gradually
populating
all
of
the
supervisory
and
upper
management
positions
in
addition
to
drilling
the
wells,
loading
the
ships,
and
manning
the
refinery
and
other
plants,
as
they
had
been
doing
for
many
years.
Throughout
the
process
it
was
a
matter
of
qualifying
for
positions,
often
an
arduous,
step-by-step
progression,
in
a
system
of
meritocracy.
In
1983
alone,
a
record
half
billion
dollars
was
budgeted
for
training.
In
that
year,
85
percent
of
all
Saudi
employees
attended
training
classes,
and
the
company
was
sponsoring
1,300
Saudis
for
university
studies.
An
Evolving
Concession
Two
provisions
of
the
original
1933
concession
agreement
were
never
questioned
or
changed.
One
required
the
concessionaire
to
employ
Saudi
Arabs
exclusively
if
they
were
qualified
and
available.
The
other
said
the
company
was
not
to
interfere
with
administrative,
political
and
religious
affairs
within
Saudi
Arabia.
But
the
terms
of
the
original
concession
agreement
between
the
Kingdom
and
Standard
Oil
Company
of
California
were
modified
and
amended
for
other
reasons,
mostly
involving
money
and
concession
area,
at
the
initiation
of
one
or
the
other.
The
first
alteration
was
a
supplementary
agreement
signed
in
1939
--
commercial
quantities
of
oil
had
been
discovered
the
preceding
year
--
that
agreed
to
various
additional
payments
to
the
government
and
extended
the
concession
area
to
its
maximum
historic
size,
about
673,000
square
miles,
and
lengthened
the
concession
period
from
60
to
66
years.
But
by
far
the
most
important
of
the
changes
was
the
so-called
50-50
agreement,
under
which
the
company
agreed
to
pay
income
taxes
(the
original
agreement
exempted
the
company
from
all
taxes):
| By
this
agreement
[signed
in
1950]
the
Saudi
government's
income
from
Aramco's
operations
came
to
be
linked
primarily
not
to
the
number
of
barrels
produced
and
sold,
as
before,
but
rather
to
how
much
profit
the
company
made.
After
1950,
therefore,
the
government
showed
increasing
interest
in
the
prices
charged
for
oil,
the
cost
of
running
the
business,
and
the
accounting
methods
used
in
determining
these
things
.
.
.
At
the
same
time,
as
the
government
was
increasingly
successful
in
developing
a
group
of
technically
trained
oil
experts
in
its
Ministry
of
Petroleum,
it
also
became
more
and
more
interested
and
involved
with
the
actual
operations
of
the
company-such
things
as
exploration
programs
[and]
drilling
practices
.
.
.
5 |
By
this
time,
the
California
Arabian
Standard
Oil
Company
(CASOC),
the
subsidiary
to
which
the
concession
was
assigned
by
SOCAL,
had
brought
in
three
other
American
majors
to
what
had
been
renamed
in
1944
as
the
Arabian
American
Oil
Company.
The
Texas
Company
(later
Texaco)
was
the
first,
in
1937,
with
Standard
Oil
Company
of
New
Jersey
(later
Exxon)
and
Socony-Vacuum
(later
Mobil)
joining
in
1948.
The
keen
interest
that
the
Saudi
government
now
had
in
how
Aramco
ran
its
business
on
a
50-50
basis
was
expressed
in
several
ways.
The
company,
at
the
government's
request,
moved
its
headquarters
from
New
York
to
Dhahran
in
1952.
The
government
began
auditing
Aramco's
books
on
a
regular
basis.
And,
in
1959,
two
Saudis
were
appointed
to
Aramco's
board
of
directors.
The
first
sign
that
the
concession
was
not
going
to
live
for
its
full
66-year
period
came
in
1968,
when
Oil
Minister
Ahmed
Zaki
Yamani
first
raised
the
issue
of
Saudi
"participation"
in
Aramco,
whereby
the
Kingdom
would
buy
into
the
company
in
increments,
purchasing
for
itself
rights
to
certain
quantities
of
oil
it
would
market
on
its
own
as
well
as
becoming
active
in
management
decisions.
The
first
25
percent
interest
was
acquired
by
Saudi
Arabia
in
1973.
At
no
time
did
the
drive
for
Saudi
ownership
imply
that
something
was
broken
and
needed
fixing,
although
increased
pressure
was
now
applied
on
Aramco
to
accelerate
Saudi
hiring
and
training,
and
for
replacement
of
Americans
with
Saudis
in
top
management
positions.
Full
100
percent
ownership
of
Aramco
was
reached
in
1980,
with
beneficial
financial
effect
from
1976.
In
part
to
reassure
the
work
force
that
no
drastic
change
was
in
store,
the
government
did
not
displace
Aramco
with
its
own
national
oil
company
immediately
--
waiting
a
full
eight
years.
As
symbolic
reinforcement
that
past
and
present
were
being
merged
seamlessly,
the
government
announced
that
the
new
entity
created
in
1988
was
to
retain
the
old
acronym
and
be
known
as
"Saudi
Aramco."
Now
the
Saudi
company
was
to
invite
Americans
to
join
its
board
of
directors
as
the
American
company
had
done
with
Saudi
appointments
30
years
earlier.
The
Americans
included
Harold
Haynes
and
James
Kinnear,
the
retired
heads
of
Chevron
and
Texaco
respectively.
While
during
the
course
of
the
concession
there
were
on
occasion
sharply
divergent
positions
on
the
Aramco
and
Saudi
government
sides,
few
left
permanent
scars,
and
only
once
was
it
necessary
to
resort
to
outside
arbitration
(when
Aramco
resisted,
successfully,
the
government's
interference
with
the
company's
prerogative
of
determining
whose
tankers
would
carry
oil
exports:
the
Aristotle
Onassis
dispute).
As
former
Oil
Minister
Yamani
summed
up
the
relationship:
"In
a
closed
room
we
sit
down
and
quarrel,
but
finally
we
reach
an
agreement."6
Character
of
the
Saudi-American
Relationship
The
fact
that
Aramco
brought
on
its
own
redundancy
by
training
and
educating
Saudis
to
eventually
displace
Americans
and
other
nationals
was
the
most
important
factor
in
a
concession
relationship
that
was
generally
amiable.
Another
factor
was
the
nature
of
the
communication
between
the
two
parties.
Most
routine
contacts
with
the
government's
municipal,
provincial
and
ministry
offices
were
channeled
through
the
company's
Government
Relations
organization.
This
insured
a
uniform
approach
to
presenting
and
resolving
problems.
Mutual
confidence
grew
out
of
the
Americans
making
"courtesy
calls,"
when
no
pressing
business
issues
were
tabled,
and
by
the
fact
that
individual
American
"relations
reps"
and
individual
Saudi
counterparts
would
deal
with
each
other
over
a
period
of
many
years,
sometimes
rising
in
their
respective
hierarchies
together.
In
addition,
Aramco
found
itself
fulfilling
the
role
of
a
quasi-governmental
body
in
its
areas
of
operations
because
Saudi
Arabia,
at
least
until
the
late
1950s,
lacked
the
money,
expertise
and
structure
to
implement
and
manage
public
works.
By
this
time
there
was
a
dual
tension
at
work.
Aramco
knew
the
immense
magnitude
of
the
oil
reserves
embraced
by
the
concession
and
wanted
to
preserve
its
exclusive
access
to
them.
Saudi
Arabia
recognized
that
Aramco
had
the
expertise
and
personnel
on
the
ground
to
deliver
infrastructure
and
services
beyond
what
had
been
envisioned
by
either
side
in
the
concession
agreement.
Both
sides
played
on
advantage
and
need.
Pressured
by
the
government
and
prodded
by
its
Saudi
employees,
the
company
embarked
on
an
expensive
program
to
build
--
and
pay
the
operating
costs
for
--
public
schools
in
the
Eastern
Province
in
a
number
that
would
accommodate
on
an
ongoing
basis
a
pupil
population
equal
to
the
number
of
children
of
the
company's
Saudi
employees.
There
were
other
of
these
"community
citizenship"
programs
undertaken
by
Aramco
in
the
early
years,
most
of
them
undoubtedly
in
its
self-interest,
such
as
medical
care
for
employees
(and,
later,
their
families);
health
education
in
surrounding
towns
and
villages;
malaria
control;
trachoma
research;
farming
operations;
loans
and
technical
assistance
to
local
contractors
and
industry;
and
support
for
public
utility
development.
The
early
Saudi
workforce
was
made
up
to
a
large
extent
of
Bedouins
drawn
off
the
desert
by
wages
and
opportunity,
and
in
the
early
days
they
lived
without
their
families
in
bachelor
housing,
which
contributed
to
high
turnover.
To
address
this
problem,
the
company
introduced
a
home
ownership
program
that,
in
addition
to
subsidized
loans
and
free
lots,
involved
creating
housing
developments
complete
with
utility
lines
and
streets.
Bonds
between
Americans
and
Saudis
in
general
also
grew
over
time,
in
large
part
because
Aramco
was
a
company
in
its
own
right,
not
a
consortium
made
up
of
staff
seconded
from
member
companies
for
short
terms
of
one
to
three
years.
For
Americans
hired
up
until
the
late
1970s,
remaining
on
the
payroll
was
virtually
assured
--
poor
performance
cases
and
cyclical
cutbacks
excepted
--
and
careers
of
20
to
30
years
in
the
Kingdom
were
common.
Business
decisions
were
no
doubt
influenced
by
this
"home
town"
bias,
since
Aramco
management
in
Dhahran
would
be
more
inclined
than
the
shareholder
companies
in
the
U.S.
to
see
the
value
of
deploying
capital
into
non-oil
activities
such
as
public
school
construction.
Local
management
could
lobby
successfully
for
"good
citizenship"
expenditures
by
arguing
that
such
investments
prolonged
a
lucrative
investment.
On
a
personal
level,
friendships
and
family
associations
formed
in
this
environment
have
lasted
into
retirement
for
Saudis,
Americans
and
other
nationalities,
and
there
are
Saudis
and
Americans
in
the
company
today
whose
parents
and
grandparents
worked
together
in
Aramco.
The
Continuing
Saudi-American
Energy
Industry
Partnership
The
Saudi-owned
and
run
company
is
a
far
more
complex
and
far-flung
enterprise
than
the
American-owned
Aramco.
Aramco
explored
for
oil,
drilled
wells,
processed
oil
and
gas,
then
filled
the
oil
and
product
tankers
that
arrived
at
its
loading
ports.
Saudi
Aramco
retains
all
of
those
functions,
while
assuming
responsibility
for
all
crude
oil,
gas
and
product
marketing
internationally
and
domestically.
Saudi
Aramco
bought
or
built
21
tankers
through
its
Vela
International
Marine
subsidiary
and
entered
into
joint
venture
refining-marketing
operations
in
the
U.S.,
Philippines,
South
Korea,
and
Greece.
Saudi
Aramco
maintains
business
relationships
with
all
of
the
former
"Aramco
Four."
Its
first
joint
venture
abroad
(through
its
U.S.
subsidiary
Saudi
Refining,
Inc.)
was
in
1988
with
Texaco
in
what
was
named
Star
Enterprise,
which
included
refineries
and
a
network
of
Texaco
gasoline
stations.
(Later,
Star
gave
way
to
Motiva,
a
partnership
with
Shell
Oil
Company,
and
Texaco
was
bought
out
as
a
consequence
of
federal
regulations
relating
to
the
Texaco-Chevron
merger.)
Continuing
associations
with
former
Aramco
shareholders
include
a
joint
venture
refinery
in
Yanbu
(originally
with
Mobil,
now
ExxonMobil),
joint
ventures
for
in-Kingdom
lubricating
oil
production
and
distribution
(originally
Mobil,
now
ExxonMobil),
and
an
on-shore
concession
agreement
in
the
Saudi
Arabia-Kuwait
Neutral
Zone
(originally
Texaco
--
which
had
bought
out
Getty
--
now
ChevronTexaco).
In
1998,
Crown
Prince
Abdullah
invited
bids
on
projects
to
develop
the
Kingdom's
natural
gas
resources
in
what
amounted
to
competition
with
state-owned
Aramco,
fracturing
the
long-held
assumption
in
the
industry
that
inviting
international
oil
companies
to
return
to
upstream
involvement
was
taboo.
ExxonMobil
has
the
lead
role
in
a
proposal
for
developing
the
South
Ghawar
Area,
potentially
a
multi-billion
dollar
project
if
negotiations
move
forward
successfully.
Conclusion
Much
has
been
written
about
the
sheer
size
of
Saudi
Arabia's
oil
industry,
its
100-plus
years
of
oil
reserves,
and
the
excess
(and
costly)
oil
production
capacity
that
it
can
deploy
to
moderate
price
shocks,
as
demonstrated
during
the
1991
Gulf
War.
Yet
the
more
compelling
story
is
how
these
assets
have
come
to
be
managed
in
such
a
brief
span
of
time
by
a
previously
unindustrialized
people.
The
definitive
study
of
human
resource
development
across
Saudi
Arabia
up
until
the
mid-1980s
was
written
by
Joy
Winkie
Viola,
who
was
Dean
of
the
Office
of
International
Affairs
at
Northeastern
University
when
her
book
was
published
in
1986.7
In
it,
she
quotes
Oil
Minister
Yamani
in
his
foreward
to
Aramco's
1982
Annual
Report:
"Relations
between
the
government
of
Saudi
Arabia
and
Aramco,
like
all
complex
associations,
were
not
without
their
ups
and
downs,
but
wisdom
and
rationality
have
always
dominated."
The
Minister
went
on
to
recount
"the
creation
[by
Aramco]
of
a
Saudi
staff
who
are
pioneers
in
the
understanding
of
the
mysteries
of
the
petroleum
industry."
Viola
went
on
to
observe:
| These
are
not
the
words
of
an
embittered
government,
nor
are
they
the
angry
charges
of
a
government
that
sought
to
nationalize
its
natural
resources
without
compensation
to
the
company
that
developed
them
--
as
has
been
the
case
in
more
than
one
developing
nation.
.
.
.
.
As
many
scholars
have
attested,
the
Aramco
experience
remains
the
one
single
collaborative
effort
and
force
that
cemented
the
economic
foundation
of
a
new
nation
in
the
1930s
and
vastly
contributed
to
the
"special
relationship"
that
still
exists
between
Saudi
Arabia
and
the
United
States
today. |
Endnotes:
1.
James
Terry
Duce
speaking
to
Harry
Snyder
as
recounted
in
Saudi
Aramco
and
Its
People:
A
History
of
Training,
Aramco
Services
Company,
1998,
p.
42.
2.
The
Mulligan
Papers,
Special
Collections,
Georgetown
University
Library,
"Presentation
on
International
Oil,"
speech
by
T.C.
Barger,
Shreveport,
LA,
April
1977.
3.
Notes
provided
by
B.C.
Nelson
to
R.
L.
Norberg.
4.
Saudi
Aramco
and
Its
People:
A
History
of
Training,
p.
19.
5.
Aramco
and
Its
World,
Arabian
American
Oil
Company,
Washington,
D.C.,
1980,
p.
235.
6.
Ibid.
7.
Human
Resource
Development
in
Saudi
Arabia:
Multinationals
and
Saudization,
International
Human
Resources
Development
Corporation,
137
Newbury
Street,
Boston,
MA
02116.
Also
see
Saudi
Aramco
and
Its
People:
A
History
of
Training,
Aramco
Services
Company,
Houston,
Texas,
1998.
Chronology
of
American-Saudi
Oil
Industry
Relationships
1933:
Saudi
government
signs
concession
agreement
with
Standard
Oil
of
California
(later
Chevron),
which
operates
concession
through
new
subsidiary,
California-Arabian
Standard
Oil
Company
(CASOC).
1937:
The
Texas
Company
(later
Texaco)
joins
CASOC
as
50
per
cent
shareholder.
1944:
Name
changed
to
Arabian
American
Oil
Company.
1948:
Standard
Oil
Company
of
New
Jersey
(later
Exxon)
and
Socony-Vacuum
(later
Mobil)
join
as
shareholders.
Each
holds
a
one-third
interest,
except
for
Socony-Vacuum
with
10
percent.
1973:
Saudi
government
buys
into
the
Aramco
enterprise
with
first
increment
of
25
percent.
1980:
Saudi
government
makes
final
payment
for
100
percent
of
Aramco,
with
financial
effect
from
1976.
1988:
Saudi
National
Oil
Company
created
by
Saudi
government
to
succeed
Aramco;
new
company
to
retain
old
acronym
and
go
by
"Saudi
Aramco."
1988:
Joint
venture
of
Saudi
Aramco
(via
U.S.
subsidiary)
and
Texaco
established
as
Star
Enterprise.
1984:
Texaco
acquires
Saudi
concession
(formerly
held
by
Getty)
in
Saudi-Kuwait
Partitioned
Zone.
2001:
American
and
European
oil
companies
invited
by
Saudi
Arabia
to
conceptualize
and
bid
on
an
estimated
$25-billion
in
natural
gas
development
projects
in
the
Kingdom.
Exxon
and
Mobil
(now
one
company,
ExxonMobil)
currently
negotiating
for
project
in
South
Ghawar.
|
The
Top
Five
Annual
Oil
Production
(millions
of
barrels
daily)
|
| 1.
Saudi
Arabia |
8,7681 |
| 2.
United
States |
7,717 |
| 3.
Russia |
7,056 |
| 4.
Iran |
3,688 |
| 5.
Mexico |
3,560 |
Note
1.
11.8%
of
total
world
production
|
|
Proven
Crude
Oil
Reserves
(billions
of
barrels)
|
| 1.
Saudi
Arabia |
261.81 |
| 2.
Iraq |
112.5 |
| 3.
United
Arab
Emirates |
97.8 |
| 4.
Kuwait |
96.5 |
| 5.
Iran |
89.7 |
| Note
1.
One-quarter
of
total
world
proven
reserves
*Source:
BP
Statistical
Review
of
Energy,
June
2002
|
|