| Executive
Summary
While
differences
have
existed,
the
bilateral
relationship
between
the
United
States
and
Saudi
Arabia
has been
durable
and
mutually
beneficial.
The
foundation
of the
relationship
is a
combination
of oil,
economics
and
defense.
In the
post
World
War II
Middle
East,
the
first
challenge
was how
to
manage
the
collapse
of
imperialism
and
withdrawal
of the
British
from the
Gulf.
The
emergence
of
Egypt's
Nasser
complicated
matters,
as did
the
creation
of
Israel.
Nasser
and
Soviet
ambitions
proved
to be
great
threats
to both
the
United
States
and the
Kingdom.
But
these
threats,
like the
threats
posed by
the
Iranian
Revolution,
the
Iran-Iraq
war, and
the
Iraqi
invasion
of
Kuwait
were all
managed
successfully
through
U.S.-Saudi
cooperation.
Today,
terrorism
is the
latest
challenge
to face
the two
allies.
A
Snapshot
of the
US-Saudi
Political
Relationship
By David
Dumke
It is
not that
the
United
States
and
Saudi
Arabia
share
the same
view of
the
world,
nor have
they
shared
one in
the
past. It
is not
that the
pressures
and
challenges,
both
internal
and
external,
facing
the two
nations
are
identical,
nor have
they
been.
However,
despite
the
differences,
in the
modern
era of
Middle
East
policy -
since
the end
of World
War II -
the
political
relationship
between
the
United
States
and
Saudi
Arabia
has
proven
to be
durable
and
mutually
beneficial
in
confronting
a host
of
challenges.
In
this
relatively
short
span of
time,
Americans
and
Saudis
have
confronted
imperialism,
Nasserism,
Communism,
Baathism,
Khomeinism,
Islamic
militantism,
and
today,
terrorism.
In
managing
these
challenges,
US-Saudi
cooperation
has not
always
come
without
disagreements
of
varying
size and
scope,
nor has
either
nation
fully
taken
into
account
the
concerns
and
pressures
of their
partner.
This is
particularly
true
when one
throws
in the
other
great
"ism"
into the
mix -
Zionism
- which
has
without
question
led to
sharp
disagreements
between
these
partners.
Despite
differences
of
opinions,
the
Americans
and
Saudis
wisely
have
agreed
to
disagree,
and
found
common
ground
to meet
and
achieve
common
goals.
Most
notably
these
goals
consist
of
promoting
regional
stability,
supporting
American
regional
interests,
and
ensuring
Saudi
defense.
Paramount
to all
three of
these
goals,
of
course,
is
maintaining
a stable
and
uninterrupted
flow of
petroleum,
the
lifeblood
of both
economies,
from the
Gulf
region
to the
world's
industrialized
nations.
Even
before
the
establishment
of the
US
legation
in
Jeddah
in 1942
and the
historic
meeting
on the
USS
Quincy
between
King
Abdulaziz
and
Franklin
Roosevelt
three
years
later,
the
US-Saudi
economic
links
were
well-established.
Unlike
the
British
imperial
presence
in the
region,
initially
American
interests
in Saudi
Arabia
and the
region
were
economically
based
and
private
sector
driven.
In the
wake of
World
War II,
however,
much
more was
at
stake.
The
Soviet
threat,
lingering
but
languishing
British
imperialism,
the
creation
of
Israel,
and the
Egyptian
Free
Officers
revolution
all
posed
serious
challenges
to the
United
States,
the
Kingdom,
and the
bilateral
relationship.
The
Soviet
Union,
ironically
the
first
nation
to
recognize
Saudi
Arabia
in 1926,
and no
less
ironically
an early
oil
exporter
to Saudi
Arabia,
posed an
ominous
threat
to the
United
States
immediately
after
the end
of World
War II.
Communism
had
already
taken
root in
Eastern
Europe
and
Asia,
and the
Americans
feared
Soviet
entry
into the
Middle
East.
Soviet
moves in
Iran and
support
of
Israel
were
well
documented,
and
Americans
felt
that
further
encroachment
on the
resource-rich
region
could be
catastrophic.
While
the
Soviet
threat
did not
initially
consume
the
Kingdom
to the
degree
it did
the
Americans,
ideologically
godless
Communism
had
little
appeal
to the
Saudis
-- even
less so
in light
of the
fact
that the
Soviets
had
brutally
imposed
the
stamp of
their
atheistic
rule and
institutions
on
millions
of the
Kingdom's
fellow
Muslims
in
Central
Asia and
the
Caucasus.
Americans
knew
imperialism
was on
the
wane,
but the
British
presence
was
still
strong
throughout
the
Middle
East,
particularly
in the
Gulf.
Though
the
Americans
were
well
aware of
the
unpopularity
of the
British
presence
in the
region,
the
British
guaranteed
oil
would
flow to
the West
and
helped
maintain
a
semblance
of
political
stability.
The
Saudis,
however,
resented
the
British,
and felt
that
British
support
of their
Hashemite
rivals
in
Baghdad
and
Amman,
as well
as
influence
in Iran,
Kuwait,
Oman,
and the
Trucial
States
was
menacing.
From an
Arab
perspective,
the
British
exploited
the
region's
oil, and
profited
at the
expense
of the
region.
In 1956,
the
British
also
joined
forces
with
Israel
and
France
to
invade
the Arab
world's
most
populous
country.
| The
creation
of
Israel
in
May
of
1948
further
complicated
matters
for
the
Saudis
and
Americans.
Israel
was
anathema
to
the
Saudi
government
as
it
was
to
every
other
Arab
state.
In
addition
to
concern
over
the
plight
of
the
Palestinians,
many
Saudis
thought
Zionism
threatening
and
foreign-imposed;
Prince
Faisal
equated
it
with
Communism,
another
loathed
foreign
ideology
trying
to
take
root
in
the
region.
The
United
States
recognized
Israel
without
Saudi
consultation,
which
the
Saudis
felt
violated
a
February
1945
promise
Franklin
Roosevelt
had
made
to
King
Abdelaziz
in
which
the
former
conveyed
to
the
latter
that
he
would
undertake
no
major
decision
with
regard
to
the
Palestine
Question
without
first
consulting
the
Saudi
monarch. |

President
Truman
meeting
on
May
8,
1951
with
Prime
Minister
David
Ben
Gurion
of
Israel
and
Abba
Eban.
They
presented
a
menora
as
a
token
of
esteem
for
President
Truman's
recognition
of
the
State
of
Israel
on
May
14,
1948.
|
President
Truman's
famous
quote
about
having
no Arab
constituents
while
having
many
Jewish
ones,
which
made his
decision
to
recognize
Israel
appear
entirely
domestically
motivated,
incensed
the
Saudis.
Without
revisiting
the
merits
of this
decision,
Truman
made a
profound
point
about
domestic
political
pressures
on
American
foreign
policy,
being
that the
proverbial
squeaky
wheel
gets the
grease.
To this
day,
this
concept
has not
been
fully
understood
by many
in the
Arab
world.
 |
The
July
23,
1952
Egyptian
Free
Officers
Revolution
had
a
profound
impact
on
the
region,
and
on
the
US-Saudi
relationship.
Among
other
goals,
Gamal
Abdel-Nasser
wanted
to
eliminate
the
British
presence
from
Egypt,
and,
in
calling
for
increased
unity
in
the
Arab
and
Islamic
world,
reduce
Western
influence
in
the
region.
While
Nasser's
anti-imperialist
rhetoric
appealed
to
many
Saudis
and
had
resonance
with
members
of
the
royal
family,
in
time
both
the
Saudis
and
Americans
concluded
that
Nasser
was
attempting
to
create
a
pan-Arab
nation
in
his
own
making.
As
oil
was
one
of
the
weapons
in
Nasser's
pan-Arab
quiver,
the
United
States
naturally
found
the
charismatic
Egyptian
a
threat.
His
popularity
and
evolving
political
orientation
would
make
him
dangerous
to
the
Kingdom. |
Thus,
in the
1950's
the
US-Saudi
relationship
faced a
variety
of
challenges.
Arguably,
however,
it was
Nasser
and his
actions
in
regard
to
Communism,
imperialism,
and
Israel
that
would
strengthen
American-Saudi
ties and
increase
the
importance
of the
relationship.
Saudi
Arabia
would
prove to
be
the most
important
political
Arab
ally of
the
United
States.
In
the
course
of the
1950's,
the
British
regional
influence
sagged,
particularly
after it
took
provocative
measures
(or
interpreted
as such
by the
Saudis)
to
settle
boundary
disputes
with the
Kingdom
and its
ill-fated
and
politically
suicidal
military
alliance
with
Israel
in 1956.
In both
cases,
the
Americans
sided
with the
Kingdom
at the
expense
of the
British.
By
cooperating
with the
Kingdom
and its
other
regional
allies
(primarily
Iran),
the
Americans
displaced
the
British
as the
guarantor
of the
flow of
oil to
the
West.
Soviet
arms and
aid to
Nasser
naturally
angered
and
alarmed
the
United
States.
The
formation
of the
United
Arab
Republic
between
Egypt
and
Syria,
on one
hand,
and the
Iraqi
revolution,
and the
failure
of the
American-initiated
Omega
and
Alpha
Plans,
tilted
the
region
toward
Nasser
and to
the left
of the
political
spectrum.
The
Omega
plan had
sought
to
undermine
Nasser's
regional
position,
while
Alpha
had
attempted
to
resolve
the
Arab-Israeli
conflict.
The
aggressive
Egyptian
propaganda
machine
relentlessly
attacked
Saudi
Arabia
and
Jordan.
At
this
precarious
time,
Saudi-American
cooperation
proved
mutually
beneficial.
Saudi
oil
resources
were
important
to the
United
States
and
vital to
the
America's
allies,
and the
money it
generated
was
vital to
the
Kingdom.
Politically,
the
Kingdom
assured
the
United
States
of a
friendly
and
powerful
ally in
the
region,
and
served
as a
bulwark
against
the
Nasser-Communist
forces.
US
assistance,
particularly
military
assistance,
greatly
helped
the
Kingdom
during
this
difficult
period.
The
decision
to
supply
military
assistance
to the
Kingdom
was
first
made by
Franklin
Roosevelt.
During
World
War II,
the
Kingdom
was made
eligible
for
lend-lease
assistance.
In the
post-World
War II
world,
the
Israel
factor
complicated
this
decision
despite
Nasser
and the
Soviets.
While
Congress
embraced
the
Eisenhower
Doctrine,
which
called
for
providing
economic
and
military
assistance
to
Middle
Eastern
nations
opposing
Communism,
it
forced
the
Administration
to
accept a
provision
guaranteeing
safe
passage
of
Israeli
ships
through
the Gulf
of Aqaba.
Pro-Israeli
forces
protested
each
shipment
of arms
to the
Kingdom.
Domestic
pressures
clearly
impaired
the
level of
assistance,
and also
contributed
significantly
to the
decision
to
supply
US
military
assistance
to
Israel.
This
highlights
a
continuing
challenge
to US
Administrations
and
lawmakers
in
Congress
as to
how to
provide
arms to
the
Saudis
(or
Egypt
today)
to
bolster
the
Kingdom's
ability
to
defend
itself
against
numerous
potential
foes
while
not
alarming
the
supporters
of
Israel,
who fear
these
weapons
will be
used
offensively
against
the
Jewish
state.
The
problems
posed by
Nasser
continued
into the
1960's,
as did
American
assistance
to the
Kingdom.
Despite
Nasser's
allegations,
the
Kingdom
made its
own
strategic
decisions,
even
ones not
popular
with the
Americans,
such as
the
decision
not to
renew
the
American
lease to
the air
base at
Dhahran.
In 1962,
rhetoric
turned
to
military
action
in
Yemen,
where
Nasser
sent
troops
to
bolster
the
Republican
forces,
while
the
Kingdom
supported
the
Yemeni
royalists.
The
Middle
East
would be
shaken
up
significantly
in 1967.
Militarily,
Nasser
and the
Arab
armies
were
routed
by
Israel.
However,
the
biggest
casualty
politically
was the
death of
Nasserism.
While
Nasser
would
live
until
1970, he
spent
all his
political
capital
in 1967,
and his
regional
influence
was
largely
destroyed.
In fact,
so great
was the
loss,
Nasser
was
forced
to
accept
assistance
from
Saudi
Arabia.
Nasser
also had
to
listen
to, as
opposed
to
lecture
or
demonize,
King
Faisal,
now in a
stronger
position
regionally
than
Nasser.
"These
people
(the
Russians)
are
atheists
and
Abdel
Nasser's
continued
relationship
with
them
will
harm him
greatly.
The
Russians
do not
wish him
or Egypt
either
prosperity
or
success,"
King
Faisal
said to
a Nasser
aide in
a
comment
which
must
have
greatly
pleased
the
United
States.
In
October
1973,
the
region
was
again
altered
by
an
Arab-Israeli
war.
However,
the
results
of
this
war
were
different.
Egypt
and
the
Arabs
regained
military
respectability
on
the
battlefield,
which
allowed
Anwar
Sadat
to
pursue
a
peace
treaty
with
Israel.
Politically
and
economically,
however,
the
Arab
oil
embargo,
initiated
by
King
Faisal,
a
strong
American
ally
against
Communism,
had
lasting
impact,
particularly
psychologically.
Faisal's
decision
was
made
in
large
part
because
President
Nixon
broke
his
word
and
provided
emergency
military
assistance
to
Israel.
The
oil
embargo
did
spike
gas
prices
and
was
a
powerful
weapon,
but
it
also
engendered
resentment
in
the
United
States.
The
image
of
the
"wealthy
Arab
sheik"
was
implanted
in
the
mind
of
the
average
American.
Despite
tension,
the
Saudi-American
relationship
remained
strong
for
a
variety
of
reasons;
oil
flowed
and
Communism
was
fought. |
 |
The
Iranian
Revolution,
the
Iraq-Iran
Gulf
War, the
Soviet
invasion
of
Afghanistan,
and
later
the
Iraqi
invasion
of
Kuwait,
all
clearly
demonstrated
how the
US and
Saudi
Arabia
could,
by
working
together,
protect
their
mutual
interests.
The
Iranian
revolution
unleashed
the
forces
of
militant
Islam in
full.
The
Ayatollah
Khomeini
regime
aimed to
overthrow
incumbent
governments
throughout
the
region,
and
Saudi
Arabia
was the
top
target
given
its
location
and
alliance
with the
United
States.
Iran
posed a
direct
military
threat
to the
Kingdom,
as well
as a
threat
by
fomenting
dissent
among
the
Saudi
shi'a
population
in the
Eastern
Province.
Iran was
behind
hajj
riots
that
aimed at
undermining
the
Kingdom's
religious
legitimacy.
 |
The
United
States
had
long
banked
its
regional
policy
on
support
of
Iran
and
Saudi
Arabia,
both
political
and
economic
allies.
When
the
Peacock
Throne
fell,
Americans
felt
Saudi
Arabia
was
in
great
danger.
Thus,
the
US
allowed
the
sale
of
arms
to
the
Kingdom,
which
were
vital
to
its
defense
from
Iran
and
other
dangers,
such
as
North
Yemen.
Again,
however,
pro-Israeli
groups
objected,
and
succeeded
in
limiting
sales.
After
protracted
fights
in
Congress,
the
Carter
Administration
approved
the
sale
of
F-15's
in
1978,
and
the
Reagan
Administration
provided
AWACS
in
1981. |
The
Iraq-Iran
Gulf War
was
fought
on the
Kingdom's
doorstep
and
naturally
was a
cause of
concern
both in
the
Kingdom
and the
United
States.
It came
as a
relief
to many
that
neither
side
achieved
decisive
victory.
Cooperation
in
ensuring
the safe
passage
of ships
through
the Gulf
was
achieved
through
cooperation
between
the US,
Saudi
Arabia,
and the
other
nations
of the
GCC.
The
US-Saudi
response
to the
Soviet
invasion
of
Afghanistan
demonstrated
teamwork
and a
mutual
commitment
to
fighting
Communism.
Today,
however,
the role
both
played
in
defeating
the USSR
is being
reexamined.
While
US-Saudi
cooperation
was
certainly
decisive,
cooperation
after
the
Soviets
withdrew
apparently
ended,
which
many
suggest
has
created
great
problems
for both
nations
today.
The
US-Saudi
response
to the
Iraqi
invasion
of
Kuwait
demonstrated
the
unquestionable
importance
of the
alliance.
The
chemistry
between
the
allies
at the
military,
diplomatic,
and
economic
levels
during
the
1990-1991
crisis
resulted
in a
swift
allied
victory.
It
underscored
the
importance
of the
alliance
even to
Saudi
Arabia's
sharpest
critics
in
Congress,
who
remained
largely
mute in
their
criticisms
of the
Kingdom
throughout
the
1990's.
The
Arab-Israeli
peace
process
is
another
issue in
which
both
governments
have
largely
cooperated.
This was
particularly
so after
the
liberation
of
Kuwait.
The
Saudi
government
supported
Madrid,
Oslo,
Wye, and
other
efforts
to
resolve
the
conflict.
Crown
Prince
Abdullah's
plan,
unveiled
in
Beirut
in March
2002,
demonstrated
the
Saudi
commitment
to the
issue.
Setting
aside
all
other
moral
and
political
reasons
to
support
peace,
Saudi
Arabia
and the
United
States
share an
interest
in
regional
political
stability
-- it is
good for
business.
| Today,
the
US-Saudi
relationship
is
under
a
microscope.
Politically,
9-11
and
the
lingering
Arab-Israeli
conflict
have
seriously
damaged
the
Kingdom's
image
in
Washington.
The
threat
of
terrorism
is
great
to
both
nations,
and
defeating
it
will
be
difficult.
However,
it
is
important
for
policy
makers
in
both
the
United
States
and
the
Kingdom
to
keep
in
mind
that
there
have
been
trying
times
before.
And
if
the
past
is
any
indicator,
it
is
in
trying
times
that
the
US
and
Saudi
Arabia
have,
even
if
they
must
agree
to
disagree
on
certain
issues,
cooperated
and
succeeded
in
managing
a
variety
of
difficult
challenges. |
 |
|